This was May 2016… the final from Pols01, where this process essentially started. I have no memory whatsoever of writing this :D

Efforts by the Obama administration to reform immigration rules call attention to a single issue that has been taken up by agencies at multiple levels of government, at multiple times, and by multiple means. The controversial nature of immigration reform calls upon the activism of all parties involved with the crafting of law. Meanwhile, deferments of authority from Congress down to local Sheriffs have contributed to gaps between the laws that were written and the ones that are being enforced. The outcome of the Obama administration’s efforts will be determined largely by how well those varying circumstances are addressed.

The subject of immigration law today has been shaped by the changing parts played by the branches of government since the writing of the Constitution. Historically, laws are written by Congress, applied by the Executive, and validated by the Court. The 2014 midterm elections that secured opposition control over both chambers of Congress complicate the president’s task by challenging his ability to gain a legislative majority, much less get any desired legislation scheduled for debate. Returning specifically to immigration, much of the enforcement of federal immigration law has been delegated to the Executive and is currently held by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS Immigration). While the Court has affirmed this delegation of constitutional prerogative, grey areas remain when presidents seek to update the practice of the law within the context of static legislation. The avenues available for pursuit of reform are legislative or executive action. The purview of executive action is currently being deliberated by the Court in lieu of pending legislative action. 

The organizational capacities of interest groups and political parties will play a role as any legislation is shaped. Representatives in favor of reform will seek to appease as many interests as possible along the way to build support for the measure. Any differing perspectives that can be mollified will reduce opposition and help to shape the perception of the debate underway. Groups and parties on all sides of the issue will look to mobilize their memberships in shows of support or opposition. Building on that cycle, the media will alternately seek to inform or agitate their audiences depending on their many varying charters and ideologies. As opinions are broadcast and a consensus is sought, part of the weight added to any majority perspective will be the reporting of that majority. As polling agencies like Gallup collect their data, any headlines about results will help to reinforce corresponding impressions. Favorable to the administration in this context, the majority of Americans have consistently expressed support for changes to immigration policy (Gallup), varying between 58% and 68% over the past decade.

Those impressions will in turn cycle around to help shape legislative priorities. Through feedback provided by special interest groups, media coverage, and opinion polls, representatives will have a better sense of whether or not their work is on the “right” track. One other feedback mechanism is the vote. Through ballots cast, an electorate can make an existential change to the fortunes of a candidate or party because of the positions they take. As one question this November will be whether or not Democrats can rebuild a majority in Congress, the plausibility of their election will be based in large part on how much financial support their campaigns receive. Court rulings like Citizens United have assured that the more motivated wealthy partisans there are, the more money will flow in the direction of their interests and favored candidates. On occasions where campaign cycles overlap with legislative sessions, the seated representatives have an opportunity to observe firsthand the direction in which public preferences on key issues are leaning.

The evolving practice of Federalism has contributed to our current application of immigration law, and will contribute to how reform is shaped as well. As described by the Migration Policy Institute (Varsanyi, Lewis and Provine), the devolution of immigration law enforcement has resulted in a patchwork “Immigration Federalism.” The authors argue that encouraging local participation in federal immigration enforcement also encourages a sense of local ownership over immigration laws, sometimes independent of federal will or constraint. The re-assertion of federal jurisdiction over how policy is enforced will be subject to challenge by parties made stakeholders by federal devolution. United States v Texas is an argument in front of the Court by Texas and other states, that the Obama administration had overstepped congressional authority in ordering the extension of some deportation deferments. While precedent and standing would appear to be in the administration’s favor (Masters), a competing precedent of state oversight may have become compelling through a federal trend towards devolution and inaction. A legislative solution would thus circumvent the current challenge, but the “quality” of any such solution would depend heavily on the legislature available for the task.

Altogether, meaningful reform will likely require either compromise on a scale uncommon to many current partisan representatives, or a voter mobilization on a scale difficult to achieve by parties or groups. Within the context of Obama’s last year in office, legislative prospects may be determined by anticipated electoral fortunes. The Republican majority may find itself swayed by the volume of the Democratic opposition it can expect during the next session, or by the will of its own Republican electorate. Barring legislative serendipity, any favorable findings by the Court may encourage further executive action by the president. If the Court – through ruling or headcount – is unable to reinforce the executive precedent, the prospect of there being any substantive action on immigration reform for the remainder of Obama’s term becomes unlikely. While he is not precluded from issuing additional Executive Orders, judges are not precluded from holding up those orders until the Court sets a specific direction with the case before it.   

Works Cited

DHS Immigration. 15 July 2015. Web. 1 May 2016. <https://www.dhs.gov/topic/immigration-enforcement>.

Gallup. In Depth: Immigration. 10 July 2015. Web. 1 May 2016. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/1660/immigration.aspx>.

Masters, Jonathan. The US Supreme Court and Obama’s Immigration Actions. 20 April 2016. Council on Foreign Relations. Web. 1 May 2016. <http://www.cfr.org/immigration/us-supreme-court-obamas-immigration-actions/p37630>.

Varsanyi, Monica, et al. Immigration Federalism: Which Policy Prevails? 9 October 2012. Web. 1 May 2016. <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigration-federalism-which-policy-prevails>.